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Reconfiguring post-Cold War views
of international order in the
Mediterranean: The Arab uprisings
as a conceptual and material
turning point?
Frédéric Volpi
1 Twenty years before the 2011 Arab uprisings, the process that led to the collapse of the
Soviet Union gave a significant impulse to the ideological, institutional and economic
reconfiguration of the European region. This impulse came at a time where regional
stability was based on a divided Europe, and significant changes were not anticipated in
the short to medium term, least of all through a process of democratic revolutions.1
2 The sudden collapse of the communist bloc was no more anticipated than the Arab
uprisings were. Policy-makers appeared to have a limited range of options available to
them  to  bridge  the  gap  between  a  liberal  democratic  ‘West’  and  an  authoritarian
communist ‘East’ (at that time) or an authoritarian and Islamicized ‘South’ (today).2
3 During  these  two  revolutionary  periods,  long-held  views  about  the  resilience  of
authoritarian regimes and the impossibility of political change in such countries were
dramatically  transformed  (often  leading  to  hazardous  policy  choices  by  the
international community) and a new rhetoric emerged emphasising a necessary shift to
a more democratic order in the European neighbourhood.3
4 At  the  turn  of  the  1990s  a  series  of  political  and  ideological  changes,  followed  by
institutional  and  economic  transformations,  facilitated  a  relatively  rapid  shift  in
Europe from divided regional stability to unified regional stability. The query in this
paper  is  therefore  how  contemporary  transformations  in  the  Arab  world  could
contribute to similar dynamics in the Mediterranean region today. 
5 To  construct  an  argument,  grounded  on  path-dependency,  I  consider  here  three
aspects of regionalization by institutionalized social and political actors: first, the
Reconfiguring post-Cold War views of international order in the Mediterranean...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 89 | 2014
1
dominant narratives in the discursive construction of the Mediterranean; second, the
main  mechanisms  of  institutionalization  of  a  regional  system;  and  third,  the  main
policies of socio-economic governance in the region. In so doing, I acknowledge that
such an approach leaves out many other factors that could be invoked to evaluate the
substance and evolution of Mediterranean ideas and practices.
 
Historicizing the questions
6 In the Mediterranean region, there have been repeated convergences and divergences
of  an  ideational  and  material  nature  between  states  and  communities.  These
phenomena  illustrate  the  centrifugal  and  centripetal  trends  in  the  region  that
underpin the construction of a more unified regional entity and their fragmentation
into more autonomous components.
7 In  the  twentieth  century,  during  the  colonial  period,  the  international  arena  was
characterized  by  expansionism  and  power  projection  by  European  powers.  Their
realpolitik approach  to  the  eastern and  southern  Mediterranean  subordinated  local
interests –politically, culturally and economically– to those of the dominant imperial
powers. There was therefore a strong push toward a form of regional integration, but it
was  a  forced  homogenization  that  did  not  have  the  endorsement  of  many  of  the
communities on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.4 
8 The early post-colonial period, in contrast, exhibited new trends toward fragmentation
as  former  colonies  focused  their  attention  on  domestic  development  and  regime
stabilization. Two noticeable counter-trends marked the early post-colonial period. On
the northern shores of the Mediterranean, the nucleus of the European Union put in
place the ideational, institutional and economic basis of European integration (which,
incidentally,  at  the  time  of  the  1957  Rome  treaty  included  Algeria  as  a  French
department).
9 On the southern shores, another type of ideological integration gained momentum on
the  basis  of  pan-Arabism.  Soon,  however,  political  tensions  among  the  leaders  of
authoritarian post-colonial  regimes ensured that  this  template was not  followed by
viable  institutional  and economic rapprochements.  This  was a  period of  ideological
politics, intensified by Cold War rivalries between the USA and the USSR, that ensured
continuing atomisation of the ‘South’ and defiance vis-à-vis the ‘West’.5
10 In this perspective, in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, three
turning  points  can  be  readily  identified  in  relation  to  the  regional  dynamics  of
integration/disintegration  in  the  Mediterranean:  the  end  of  the  Cold  war;
September 11, 2001; and the Arab uprisings.
 
Turning points in the modern Mediterranean region
The 1990s
11 The end of the Cold War initiated a new ideological, institutional and socio-economic
process of rapprochement within Europe. Yet it  is questionable how significant this
change was in the 1990s for increasing regional interaction and collaboration in the
Mediterranean. In particular, it is useful to ask to what extent the end of the Cold War
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merely  discursively  portrayed  a  greater  regional  integration  instead  of  actually
introducing new dynamics into the region. And even at the ideational level, it is worth
noting that while this transformation may be marked by a rather idealistic approach to
development and democratization in the ‘North’, it is by contrast often seen from a
more pragmatic if not disabused angle in the ‘South’.6 
12 In the Mediterranean context, many of these trends did not emerge suddenly at the end
of  the  Cold  War  after  a  wave  of  regime  change  but  slowly  gained  momentum
throughout  the  1980s  to  become  dominant  in  the  post-Cold  War  context.  In  this
perspective it could be argued that the Barcelona process initiated in 1994 provided an
institutional  framework for  many pre-existing trends  rather  than actually  spurring
many new integrative processes.7
13 In particular, from a socio-economic perspective, the neoliberal policies of the so-called
Washington consensus (a term coined in 1989) were slowly endorsed and implemented
throughout  the  non-socialist  parts  of  the  Mediterranean  during  the  1980s,  most
notably under the aegis of the IMF. The IMF process of structural adjustment may have
had a sound macro-structural economic logic, but it generated high social costs on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean, and thus appeared to sharpen the North-South
divide.8 In  addition,  in  many polities  the  EU-sponsored Programme  de  Mise  à  Niveau
(PMN) indirectly strengthened the leverage of authoritarian regimes over the private
sector and favoured crony-capitalism.9
14 From  an  institutional  angle,  the  EU  model  and  its  acquis  communautaire slowly
established  itself  as  the  norm,  first  in  Southern  Europe  (including,  to  a  degree,  in
Turkey, which applied to be a candidate country in 1987) and then in Eastern Europe.
Hence,  the  Barcelona  process  proposed  only  a  limited  version  of  this  model  of
governance without the possibility of full membership being offered to the countries
on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.10
15 Finally, at the ideological level, while the 1990s saw the rise of the discourse of liberal
democracy  in  the  region,  it  clearly  was  only  rhetorically  endorsed  and
instrumentalized  by  ruling  elites  in  the  south.  The  ideational  dimension  of  the
Mediterranean  region  constructed  in  the  Barcelona  declaration  was  known  to  be
artificial but was meant to be inspirational.11 By the end of the decade, the lip service
paid by authoritarian regimes in the ‘South’ to this democratic discourse may well have
been  the  price  that  vice  paid  to  virtue,  but  the  normative  democratic  ideal  was
increasingly weakened by the pretence of democratic regimes in the ‘North’ to believe
the reformist rhetoric of their authoritarian partners.12
 
The 2000s
16 At the beginning of the 2000s, al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 attack on the United States
initiated a  new turn  in  international  relations  and,  by  implication,  in  the  regional
dynamics  of  the  Mediterranean.  Superficially,  the  initiation  of  the  ‘War  on  Terror’
provided  another  framework  for  regional  integration  through  common  security
initiatives and policies. Substantially, however, the dominance of the ‘Islamist threat’
security  frame and the implications of  securitization had a  negative impact  on the
ideational  and  material  processes  of  regionalization  imagined  at  the  time  of  the
Barcelona declaration.13
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17 Ideationally, the emphasis on international security as an outcome of regime stability
in the region further undermined an already weakened notion of democratic normative
order for the region. It indirectly validated the continuing division between democratic
and  non-democratic  regimes  –roughly  between  the  north  and  the  south  of  the
Mediterranean  region–  by  prioritizing  a  convergence  of  security  policies  over  a
convergence of models of governance.14 In this context, it is not that surprising that the
framework of the Union for the Mediterranean devised by French president Nicolas
Sarkozy as a new model for cooperation across the Mediterranean in the second half of
the  2000s  should  have  as  its  modus  vivendi  co-ownership  with  ruling  southern
autocrats.15
18 The  securitization  paradigm also  affected  the  dynamics  of  socio-economic
rapprochement, notably by hindering the circulation of goods and persons on the basis
of  security  risks.  Increased  attempts  by  European  governments  to  strictly  control
migratory  fluxes,  often  through  a  re-prioritization  of  bilateral  relations,  validated
migration policies that further entrenched those authoritarian regimes that presented
themselves as the bulwark against migration (viz. Libya in relation to Italy).16
19 Institutionally, the new international and regional security paradigm strengthened the
capabilities of authoritarian institutions (including those of the police and armed forces
through increased sales of weaponry) in order to improve the security and surveillance
capabilities of those regimes on the southern shores of the Mediterranean which were
allies in the ‘War on Terror’ –including unlikely candidates such as Gaddafi’s Libya.17
The  desire  to  bolster  the  capabilities  and  stability  of  such  authoritarian  regimes
contributed to a partial blindness to their internal weaknesses and to the possibilities
of change in the region.18
 
The 2010s 
20 The unannounced Tunisian democratic revolution that kick-started the Arab uprisings
set in motion a wave of regime change on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. It
revealed the causal  importance of  a  form of popular-based leaderless/leaderful  and
ideology-less revolutionary mobilization that had remained underestimated by analysts
and policy-makers up to that point.19
21 Ideationally, the political revolutions initiated by the Arab uprisings in 2011 enabled a
reversion to the idealized democratizing discourse of the end of the Cold War and of
the  Barcelona  declaration,  as  well  as  encouraging  some  versions  of  Arabism  and
positive views of an Arab-Islamic public. There was also an explicit ‘mea culpa’ from
many  EU  and  European  policy-makers  who  assured  their  audiences  that  they  had
learned from their mistakes in collaborating with authoritarian regimes. 
22 In 2011, Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood,
stated: 
Europe  was  not  vocal  enough  in  defending  human  rights  and  local  democratic
forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian
regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It
was, at best, short-termism –and the kind of short-termism that makes the long
term ever more difficult to build.20
23 However, what became clear over the following months, and up to the present day, was
that this ideological sea-change in perceptions of the region was quite transient and
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was  tied  to  the  political  vagaries  of  the  post-revolutionary  situation  (viz.  the  2013
military coup in Egypt).21
24 Politically and institutionally, there are important distinctions to be made between the
immediate response of international and regional state actors and organisations, and
their medium-term political and institutional orientations (which become visible only
now).
25 First, the immediate political response to the 2011 uprisings did not provide the kind of
fresh policy start that had been witnessed toward Eastern Europe in 1989-91. Certainly
there was a new explicit support for and rapprochement with the new revolutionary
elites  of  Tunisia,  Libya  and  Egypt  (until  2013),  but  at  the  same  time  there  was
continuing  political  and  institutional  support  for  the  status-quo  states  (Morocco,
Algeria, Jordan). In addition, there was also ambiguity toward situations in Syria and,
later, vis-à-vis Egypt’s new military-backed regime. Overall, the political orientation of
the EU seemed to indicate a continuing deprioritization of the democratic agenda in
the articulation of its policies toward the Mediterranean.22
26 Second, after the immediate period of revolutionary change there was clearly a lack of
a rearticulation of institutional models of association at the regional level, as illustrated
by the continuation of EU negotiations for an advance partnership status with Tunisia
(similar to that of Morocco) on the basis of prenegotiations with the Ben Ali regime.
Despite some financial rewards –such as those of the Spring programme– for the new
democratic  regimes,  the  EU  did  not  differently  institutionalize  its  relations  with
democratic and non-democratic regimes on the southern shores of the Mediterranean
(in the way it did, for example, in Eastern Europe with accession candidates after 1989).
23
27 From an economic perspective, too, while socio-economic tensions were clearly one of
the  main  elements  underpinning  the  uprisings  in  the  Arab  world  and  the  protest
movements  in  Southern  Europe  at  around the  same time  (Greece,  Spain,  Portugal)
there was no a change of economic framework for regional integration. The neo-liberal
orthodoxy that shaped the economic response of the EU to the financial crisis that most
affected its southern European members similarly framed the socio-economic response
of the EU toward the Arab Spring countries.24 This was all the more damaging given
that  the  Arab  uprisings  often  were  aimed  precisely  at  the  harsh  consequences  of
neoliberal policies and market capitalism on the poorer strata of society.25
28 In substance, the economic deal proposed post-2011 to newly democratic regimes of the
region is not only the same as the one proposed under Ben Ali, Gaddafi and Mubarak,
but it  is  also the same as the one proposed to countries that did not go through a
process of democratization during the Arab uprisings (Morocco,  Algeria,  Jordan).  In
effect, the additional funds proposed to post-revolutionary regimes are directed only at
the top institutions, and are not very significant considering the upheaval generated by
revolutionary change. In addition, now like before, there is still no conditionality that
would link economic and political liberalization (as the relations with Egypt after the
coup illustrate).26
29 The medium-term response of European governments (or rather the lack of it)  also
illustrates policy continuity vis-à-vis the Mediterranean region before and after the
Arab uprisings. Ideationally, political approaches still emphasize a reform process that
would create a unified liberal democratic model in the region. Practically, however, we
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still  have  a  neorealist  interpretation  of  the  Barcelona  vision  that  subordinates
institutional and economic initiatives to traditionally defined national interest for all
the relevant states involved.27
30 Equally, for southern actors, the initial Arabist and Islamist solidarity in the region at
the  time  of  the  uprisings  did  not  result  in  tangible  institutional  or  economic
rapprochements.  In  addition,  attempts  by  other  regional  players,  such  as  the  Gulf
States, to take advantage of regime change in North Africa destabilised even further the
post-uprising situations in these countries.  Hence,  the involvement of  international
actors other than the EU in the Mediterranean did not facilitate regional integration –
quite the opposite.28
31 In the post-revolutionary context, new tensions emerged to replace old ones, and there
was a  noticeable  return of  ideological  politics,  particularly  in  the shape of  Islamist
versus secularist approaches to governance. This situation reduced even further the
already weakened institutional capacity of states to collaborate regionally on difficult
issues (viz. Egyptian coup, Syrian conflict, Israel-Palestine tensions). Overall, the post-
Arab uprising period seems to have reaffirmed the dynamics of fragmentation seen
during the preceding decade of the ‘War on Terror’.29
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ABSTRACTS
This paper addresses the significance of the 2011 Arab uprisings for the construction of a more
cohesive Mediterranean region. It considers the evolution of the political dynamics of integration
and non-integration in the Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War. It examines how far the
processes initiated by the Arab uprisings provide a new impulse for regional integration and how
far  the  new  post-revolutionary  dilemmas  prolong  and/or  strengthen  the  kind  of  regional
fragmentation witnessed during the preceding decade of the “war on terror”.
Cet article étudie la signification des insurrections arabes du printemps 2011 sur la construction
d’une  région  Méditerranée  plus  intégrée.  Il  considère  l’évolution  des  dynamiques  politiques
d’intégration et de non-intégration en Méditerranée depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Il étudie
jusqu’où  les  processus  issus  des  insurrections  arabes  produisent  une  nouvelle  impulsion  en
direction de l’intégration régionale et jusqu’où les difficultés post-révolutionnaires prolongent
et/ou renforcent la fragmentation régionale observée au cours de la décennie qui a précédé la
« guerre contre la Terreur ». 
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Mots-clés: intégration régionale, dynamiques politiques, démocratisation, Union européenne,
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Frédéric Volpi is senior lecturer in international politics in the School of International Relations
of the University of Saint Andrews (Scotland). Most recently he is the author of Political Islam
Observed: Disciplinary Perspectives (Oxford University Press USA, 2010) and editor of Political Civility
in the Middle East (Routledge, 2011). fv6@st-andrews.ac.uk
Reconfiguring post-Cold War views of international order in the Mediterranean...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 89 | 2014
8
